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NOTES
PRIVATE POSSESSION OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: THE
TENSIONS BETWEEN STANLEY v. GEORGIA AND NEW
YORK v. FERBER
Historically, the United States Supreme Court has refused to interpret the first amendment1 as an unconditional guarantee of free
speech.2 Although absolutists contend that the first amendment
protects all speech,3 the Court has always set limits short of this
broad interpretation.4 The problem of sexually explicit speech has
plagued the Court in its efforts to define the scope of the first
amendment.5 Repeated attempts to formulate a standard of first
amendment protection regarding sexually explicit speech have divided the Court and resulted in confusing applications of the law.'
Members of the Court have agreed, however, on one important aspect of this issue: the Constitution protects the private possession
of otherwise unprotected speech in the home.7 For more than fifteen years this principle has been a touchstone of personal liberty
in an age of increasing governmental intrusion into daily life.
1. "Congress shall make no law. . abridging the freedom of speech ... ." U.S. CONST.
amend. I. The first amendment applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
For an in-depth discussion of the extent of this application, see Van Alstyne, A Graphic
Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 107, 142-48 (1982).
2. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). "There are certain...
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise
any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous,
and the insulting." Id. at 571-72 (citation omitted).
3. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865 (1960); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF
FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 6 (1970) (arguing that the individual's achievement of self-fulfillment through expression is an independent first amendment value).
4. E.g., Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571. "It is well understood that the right of free speech is
not absolute at all times and under all circumstances." Id.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 23-31.
6. For example, in Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974), the Court invalidated a conviction under Georgia's obscenity law because the jury had misapplied the standard for offensive speech to ban exhibition of the film Carnal Knowledge.
7. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). See infra text accompanying notes 33-35.

187

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:187

Consistent with its early holding that the first amendment does
not protect obscene speech," the Court has gradually refined and
narrowed the scope of first amendment protection afforded to sexually explicit speech.9 A common thread in the Court's development and application of each new standard has been its balancing
of the harm to the community from the circulation of obscene material against the harm to the community when speech is
restricted. 10
In New York v. Ferber," the Court addressed the constitutionality of state statutes restricting child pornography that was not legally obscene.' 2 The Court applied its balancing test and held that
the statutes were within the state's power to protect the welfare of
its children.' s In Ferber, the Court recognized a new level of harm
to the community-the physical and psychological abuse of children-and on that basis permitted states to prohibit the production and distribution of child pornography regardless of whether it
was legally obscene.' 4
Armed with the justification of protecting child victims, 5 some
states have extended their child pornography statutes to prohibit
private possession of child pornography. 6 These statutes are in di8. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 22-32.
10. The Supreme Court has made clear that the important element in this balancing is
not the content of the speech but the fact that speech might be restricted because of its
content. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). "All ideas having even the
slightest redeeming social importance-unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas
hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion-have the full protection of the guaranties
[given speech and press by the first amendment] ...
" Id. at 484. See also Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber,1982 Sup. CT. REV. 285, 286-87 (pointing out
that the cases shaping the development of first amendment protection of speech have involved not meaningful political dissent but ideas such as those expressed by Jehovah's Witnesses, the Ku Klux Klan, and the American Nazi Party).
11. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
12. The Court has defined child pornography as "works that visually depict sexual conduct by children below a specified age." Id. at 764 (emphasis in original). The current Supreme Court test for obscenity is set out in note 30 infra.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 756-58.
15. Id. at 756-60.
16. For example, the Illinois statute provides that "[a] person commits the offense of
child pornography who. . .with the knowledge of the nature or content thereof, . . . possesses any . . . visual reproduction of any child . . . engaged in any [prohibited sexual]
activity ..
" ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-20.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987).
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rect conflict with the principle espoused by the Court in Stanley v.
Georgia17 that the Constitution protects the private possession of
obscene material in the home. 18 Supporters of state legislation
criminalizing private possession have emphasized the state's interest in protecting child victims. They argue that the Court should
adopt the rationale that failed in Stanley: that the harm caused by
obscene speech is greater than the danger inherent in prohibiting
speech.' 9 In State v. Meadows 20 the Ohio Supreme Court adopted
this rationale, holding that the state's interest in protecting children from physical and psychological abuse outweighed the protection of speech under the first amendment.2
The decision in Meadows sets the state interests vindicated in
Ferber on a collision course with the constitutional protections established in Stanley. This Note explores the policies behind the
Court's decisions in Stanley and Ferber and analyzes the decision
in Meadows in light of these policies. The Note concludes that legislation criminalizing the private possession of child pornography
is not directly related to the harms intended to be prevented and is
therefore an unreasonable restriction of important first and fourth
amendment values.
APPLICATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO OBSCENE SPEECH

In Roth v. United States,22 the first case to challenge the constitutionality of federal obscenity laws, the Supreme Court refused to
extend first amendment protection to obscene speech. Justice
Brennan wrote that "implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance. ' 2 The Court's first definition of obscenity proved
difficult for lower courts to apply. 24 Nine years later, in Memoirs v.
17. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 33-35.
19. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565-67.
20. 28 Ohio St. 3d 43, 503 N.E.2d 697 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1581 (1987).
21. Id. at 52, 503 N.E.2d at 704-05.
22. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
23. Id. at 484.
24. The Court in Roth adopted as its test of obscenity "whether to the average person,
applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as
a whole appeals to prurient interest." Id. at 489. The difficulties in applying this standard
became evident in subsequent cases. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 705
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Massachusetts, the Court, in a plurality opinion , emphasized that
this standard required disputed material to be "utterly without redeeming social value."2 5 This definition reflected an attempt to
safeguard first amendment values and sent a message to lower
courts that all but the most hard-core material was protected.
Requiring the prosecution to prove a negative-that the disputed material was "utterly without redeeming
social
value"-made a conviction for obscenity nearly impossible to obtain. 26 The practical difficulties of such a standard quickly became
obvious, and the following Term, the Court revised its obscenity
standard in Redrup v. New York. 2 7 The new test called for a community standard of judgment in determining whether the material
was "utterly without redeeming social value. '2 8 The subjective nature of the Redrup test left lower courts little guidance, however,
and the Supreme Court found itself the frequent arbiter of
whether material was legally obscene.2 9 In Miller v. California,the
Court again reworked its standard for obscenity, this time revising
the value test to protect material having serious artistic, scientific,
political or literary value.3 0 Although lower courts have sometimes

(1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("there is among the present members of the Court a sharp
divergence as to the proper application of the standards in Roth"); T. EMERSON, supra note
3, at 474-81, 490-91.
25. Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966) (emphasis in original).
26. Reviewing the Memoirs standard seven years later, the Court observed that the burden on the prosecution was "virtually impossible to discharge under our criminal standards
of proof." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22 (1973).
27. 386 U.S. 767 (1967) (per curiam).
28. The new test required that the material be patently offensive by community standards, that its dominant theme appeal to a prurient interest in sex, and that it be utterly
without redeeming social value. Id. at 770-71.
29. Justice Harlan criticized the Court's approach to the obscenity cases, complaining
that "anyone who undertakes to examine the Court's decisions since Roth which have held
particular material obscene or not obscene would find himself in utter bewilderment." Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 707 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
30. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: . . . whether 'the average
person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . . whether. . . the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct. . . and
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.
Id. at 19 (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972)).
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misapplied this test,3 1 it remains the standard by which courts determine whether sexually explicit speech receives first amendment
protection.2
Stanley v. Georgia
During its reworking of the obscenity standard, the Court established an important exception to the general rule that the first
amendment does not protect obscene speech. In Stanley v. Georgia,3 3 the state prosecuted a private citizen for possession of films
that were obscene under the Miller test. The Court unanimously
reversed the conviction, declaring that "[i]f the First Amendment
means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a
man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or
3' 4
what films he may watch.
The Court's opinion in Stanley established, at least in dictum,
the "right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth."3 5 Later cases quickly demonstrated, however, that the
first and fourth amendment protections articulated in Stanley did
not extend to the right to deliver 3 or import 7 obscene material. In
8 the Court further limited
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,"
its
holding in Stanley by refusing to extend first amendment protection to obscene material exhibited in the "privacy" of an adult theater. The Court held that a commercial theater could not be

31. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
32. E.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1972); State v. Meadows, 28 Ohio St. 3d 43,
503 N.E.2d 697 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1581 (1987).
33. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
34. Id. at 565.
35. Id. at 564. In discussing the foundations of this right, the Court cited Winters v. New
York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) (the principle of a free press includes distribution as well as publication) and Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 144 (1943) (first amendment protections
encompass the right to distribute and receive literature).
36. In United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971), the Court refused to extend its holding in Stanley to protect the delivery of obscene materials. The majority rejected the rationale that "if a person has the right to receive and possess [obscene] material, then someone
must have the right to deliver it to him." Reidel, 402 U.S. at 355.
37. United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8MM. Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973) (rejecting
the argument that Stanley protected the right to import obscene material for personal use);
United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971) (concluding that Stanley
did not protect the importation of obscene materials for commercial use).
38. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
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equated with a private home and that the privacy interest protected in Stanley did not follow the material outside the home.3 9
The rationale offered by the Court to justify this restriction on
first amendment freedoms was the public interest "in the quality
'40
of life and the total community environment.
Although the Court decided Stanley on first amendment
grounds, 4 ' Justice Marshall's majority opinion also invoked fourth
amendment 42 prohibitions on unreasonable search and seizure.43 At
least two other Supreme Court Justices have indicated that the
Court decided Stanley on both first and fourth amendment
45
grounds. 44 The Court has applied its holding in Stanley narrowly,
indicating that it does not intend the case to be a vehicle for the
expansion of first amendment protection of obscene material.4 6
The view that the protections established in Stanley were based
on both the first and fourth amendments may serve, however, to
maintain Stanley as a viable shield to protect private possession of
speech despite the Court's continued narrow construction of the
case.

47

39. Id. at 65-67.
40. Id. at 58.
41. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568. "We hold that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit making mere private possession of obscene material a crime." Id. See also Bowers v.
Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2846 (1986) (confirming that the decision in Stanley was firmly
grounded in the first amendment).
42. The fourth amendment provides, in part: "The right of the people to be secure in
their . . . houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
43. Justice Marshall referred to the "right to be free . . . from unwanted governmental
intrusions into one's privacy" and "the right to be free from state inquiry into the contents
of [one's] library." Stanley, 394 U.S. 564-65.
44. In his dissenting opinion in Bowers v.Hardwick, Justice Blackmun asserted that
"Stanley rested as much on the Court's understanding of the Fourth Amendment as it did
on the First." Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2852-53 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart's
concurring opinion in Stanley also emphasized the fourth amendment issues in the case.
Stanley, 394 U.S. at 569-72 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justices Brennan and White joined
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion.
45. See Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First
Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 45, 71-72 (1974).
46. See State v. Meadows, 28 Ohio St. 3d 43, 46-47, 503 N.E.2d 697, 700-01 (1986), cert.
denied, 107 S.Ct. 1581 (1987).
47. See infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
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New York v. Ferber
A new version of obscenity, child pornography, gained widespread circulation in the 1970s."' In 1982 the Supreme Court first
addressed state sanctions against child pornography. New York v.
Ferber9 involved the prosecution of a bookstore proprietor for selling two child pornography films to an undercover law enforcement
officer.50 The New York statute criminalizing the distribution of
material depicting a sexual performance by a child did not require
the material to meet the legal definition of obscenity. 51 The New
York Court of Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction under
this statute, holding that the statute prohibited "the promotion of
materials which are traditionally entitled to constitutional protection

. .

under the First Amendment."52

In reversing the New York court's decision, the United States
Supreme Court held that "the constitutionally permissible regulation of pornography could.

. .

be more extensive" when that ma-

terial involved depictions of children. 53 The Court offered five reasons to support its holding that state laws regulating child
pornography were reviewable under a more lenient standard than
other legislation affecting first amendment rights.
First, the Court found that a state's interest in safeguarding the
physical and psychological well-being of its minors was compelling. 4 In particular, the Court emphasized that "[t]he prevention
of sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance." 55 The Court specifically
48. 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 599-601 (1986)
[hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT]; Note, Child Pornography: A New Role for the
Obscenity Doctrine, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 711, 713.
49. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
50. Id. at 751-52.
51. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.10 (McKinney 1980) prohibits promotion of an obscene sexual
performance by a child. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263-15 (McKinney 1980) prohibits promotion of
the same conduct, but without the requirement that it be obscene. The defendant was
charged under both statutes and convicted by the trial court under § 263-15. Ferber, 458
U.S. at 752.
52. People v. Ferber, 52 N.Y.2d 675, 678, 422 N.E.2d 523, 525, 439 N.Y.S.2d 863, 865
(1981), rev'd, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
53. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 753.
54. Id. at 756-57.
55. Id. at 757.
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declined to "second-guess [the] legislative judgment . . . that the
use of children as subjects of pornographic materials is harmful to
the physiological, emotional, and mental health of the child."" a
Second, the Court addressed the relationship between the distribution of child pornography and the sexual abuse of children. Because the material is a permanent record of the child victim's participation in sexual acts, circulation of the material exacerbates the
harm caused by the original production.5 7 The Court reasoned that
the state had to abolish the distribution network "if the production of material which requires the sexual exploitation of children
is to be effectively controlled. ' 58 It authorized direct state action
against distributors to achieve this end.5 9 The Court also held that
states need not conform their laws regulating child pornography to
the obscenity test set out in Miller v. California." Because the
Miller standard did not reflect "the State's particular and more
compelling interest in prosecuting those who promote the sexual
exploitation of children," its criteria did not afford "a satisfactory
solution to the child pornography problem." 61
Third, the Court noted that the economic motive afforded by the
advertisement and sale of child pornography was "an integral part
of the production of such materials. '62 This was perhaps an acknowledgment of the extensive involvement of organized crime in
the child pornography industry.63 The Court easily found that the
distribution of this material provided an economic incentive for its
production and thus perpetuated the sexual abuse of children. 4
Fourth, the Court found that "[t]he value of permitting live performances and photographic reproductions of children engaged in

56. Id. at 758 (footnote omitted).
57. Shouvlin, Preventing the Sexual Exploitation of Children: A Model Act, 17 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 535, 545 (1981).
58. Ferber,458 U.S. at 759.
59. Id. at 760. The Court noted that the prosecution of distributors might be "[tihe most
expeditious if not the only practical method. . . to dry up the market for this material." Id.
60. Id. at 760-61.
61. Id. at 761.
62. Id.
63. See Note, The Child Protection Act of 1984: Child Pornography and the First
Amendment, 9 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 327, 346 (1985).
64. Ferber,458 U.S. at 761.
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lewd sexual conduct is exceedingly modest, if not de minimis."5
Invoking the value prong of the Miller test, the Court considered it
"unlikely that [such] depictions. . . would often constitute an important and necessary part of a literary performance or scientific
or educational work.""6
Fifth, the Court noted that a content-based analysis of first
amendment protection was not incompatible with its earlier decisions.6 7 The creation of a new, content-based restriction on speech
was justified, the Court reasoned, when "within the confines of the
given classification, the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake."6 " Having thus categorized the interests involved, the Court concluded that "[w]hen a
definable class of material, such as [child pornography], bears so
heavily and pervasively on the welfare of children engaged in its
production,. . . the balance of competing interests is clearly struck
and. . . it is permissible to consider these materials as without the
protection of the First Amendment."6 9 Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion emphasized the importance of this balancing element.
Although she recognized that the New York statute might encompass legitimate clinical or sociological depictions of adolescent sexuality, she concluded that the relative value of such depictions and
the potential that the statute might prohibit protected speech were
not sufficiently significant to justify invalidating the statute. 0
The Court also addressed the defendant's claims that the statute
was unconstitutionally overbroad because it would reach material
that would not "threaten the harms sought to be combatted by the
State."' 71 The New York Court of Appeals had recognized this
threat and held that the statute was unconstitutionally over-

65. Id. at 762.
66. Id. at 762-63.
67. Id. at 763. See Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 189 (1983) (discussing the Supreme Court's content-based analysis of first amendment protection of speech).
68. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763-64.
69. Id. at 764.
70. Id. at 775 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also Stone, supra note 67, at 195 (describing
the factors considered by the Court in a content-based analysis of "low-value" speech).
71. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 766.
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broad.712 The Supreme Court, however, extended the substantial
overbreadth requirement of Broadrick v. Oklahoma to "traditional
forms of expression such as books and films"7' and ruled that the
statute's potential overbreadth was insufficient to invalidate it. 74

Referring to the statute's possible chilling effect on protected expression, such as "medical textbooks

. .

. [or] pictorials in the Na-

tional Geographic," the Court registered its "serious[] doubt...
that these arguably impermissible applications of the statute
amount to more than a tiny fraction of the materials within the
statute's reach.

' 75

It further refused to assume that state courts

would increase the potentially invalid scope of the statute by giving it an expansive construction.78 The Court instead determined

that a case-by-case analysis would be sufficient to preclude overbroad applications of the statute.7
The Conflict in State v. Meadows
In 1986, the Supreme Court of Ohio decided State v. Meadows,7s
the first case to juxtapose the first amendment principle affirmed
in Stanley v. Georgia and the strong state interest recognized in
New York v. Ferber.John Meadows was convicted in Ohio Municipal Court of possessing material depicting a minor engaging in sexual activity.79 As in Stanley, the defendant did not dispute the

state's power to regulate the material in question.80 As in Stanley,
the state did not allege that the defendant possessed the material
72. People v. Ferber, 52 N.Y.2d 674, 422 N.E.2d 523, 439 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1981), rev'd, 458
U.S. 747 (1982).
73. Ferber,458 U.S. at 771-74. In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court held that "particularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved ....
the overbreadth of a statute
must ... be substantial ... judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep."
413 U.S. 602, 615 (1973). Ferber marked the Court's first application of the "substantial
overbreadth" doctrine to a case involving pure speech. See generally Note, The First
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970).
74. Ferber,458 U.S. at 773. The Court stated, "We consider this the paradigmatic case of
a state statute whose legitimate reach dwarfs its arguably impermissible applications." Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 773-74.
78. 28 Ohio St. 3d 43, 503 N.E.2d 697 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1581 (1987).

79. Id. at 44, 503 N.E.2d at 698.
80. State v. Meadows, No. C-850091, slip op. at 3 (Ohio App. Dec. 18, 1985) ("counsel...
stipulate[d] the unlawful nature of the publications"), rev'd, 28 Ohio St. 3d 43, 503 N.E.2d
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in connection with any other illegal purpose, such as distribution
or production."1 The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed Meadow's
conviction, holding that the state could not prohibit the "mere pri82
vate possession of. . . pornography in the home.1
The appeals court rested its decision on the Supreme Court's
pronouncement in Stanley that the first amendment protected
"the mere private possession of obscene matter."8 3 The court characterized the decision in Ferber as establishing the standard of
constitutional protection for child pornography, as Miller v. California had for adult obscenity. 4 In considering whether Stanley or
Ferber should control, Judge Shannon, writing for the majority,
stated:
I can derive no method, directly or subliminally, from Ferber
to advance what surely must be society's purpose to eradicate
the traffic in [child pornography]. It is of great significance to
me that, in Stanley, the Court rejected the contention by the
State of Georgia that to eliminate the traffic in pornography, it
is necessary to bar mere private possession by an individual.8 5
The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed, holding that the state's
interest in "preserving its children's privacy and protecting them
from . . .cruel physiological, mental, and emotional abuse" outweighed first amendment interests in protecting private possession
of child pornography.88 The court determined that the state interests asserted in Stanley, "to protect the individual possessor's
mind.., and to prevent future deviant sexual behavior linked to
exposure to obscene materials, ' 87 were not the same as those raised
in Meadows. Instead, the state's interests paralleled those articu-

698 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1581 (1987). See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 n.2
(1969) ("[a]ppellant does not argue that the films are not obscene").
81. Meadows, slip op. at 5 ("[t]here is no indication, directly or by innuendo, that Meadows sold, produced, or disseminated the material possessed by him"); State v. Stanley, 224
Ga. 259, 260-61, 161 S.E.2d 309, 311 (1968), rev'd, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
82. Meadows, slip op. at 8.
83. Id. at 7 (citing Stanley, 394 U.S. at 559).
84. Meadows, slip op. at 7-8.
85. Id.
86. State v. Meadows, 28 Ohio St. 3d 43, 52, 503 N.E.2d 697, 704 (1986), cert. denied, 107
S. Ct. 1581 (1987).

87. Id. at 47, 503 N.E.2d at 700.
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lated by the Supreme Court in Ferber.S" The court concluded by
deferring to the Ohio legislature's determination that prohibiting
the possession of child pornography was necessary "to halt sexual
exploitation and abuse of children."8 9
THE PROBLEM OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY

Justice White began his opinion in New York v. Ferber by noting that "[i]n recent years, the exploitive use of children in the
production of pornography has become a serious national problem."9 0 Experts estimate that an explosive growth in child pornography occurred during the 1970s.9 1 Although much of the early material was of foreign origin, pornography has increasingly involved
American children. 2 After hearings held in 1977, 93 the Senate Judiciary Committee concluded that "child pornography and child
prostitution have become highly organized, multi-million dollar industries that operate on a nationwide scale. '9 4 One estimate has
put the annual revenue of the child pornography industry in the
early 1970s at more than $2.4 billion. 5
The rapid and unexpected growth in the exploitation of children
for profit prompted a flurry of protective federal and state legislation.9 6 In particular, Congress passed the Protection of Children

88. Id. at 49-50, 503 N.E.2d at 702.
89. Id. at 51-52, 503 N.E.2d at 704.
90. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 749 (1982).
91. 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 48, at 601; (by 1977, child pornography
had become part of the commercial mainstream of pornography); Note, supra note 48, at
713.
92. 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 48, at 601-02, 601 n.410; Dudar, America
Discovers Child Pornography, Ms., Aug. 1977, at 80 (child pornography operations have
been uncovered in Chicago, Los Angeles, Houston, and New York City).
93. Hearings were held from May to September 1977 by the House Subcommittee on the
Judiciary, the Subcommittee on Select Education of the House Committee on Education
and Labor, and the Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 48, at 600 & nn.401,
403.
94. S. REP. No. 438, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 40, 42.
95. Shouvlin, supra note 57, at 544.
96. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 749 n.2 (1982). For a review of pre-1978
federal and state legislation covering child pornography, see Note, Child PornographyLegislation, 17 J. FAM. L. 505 (1978-1979).
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Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 197797 to attack the national
traffic in child pornography. The Act prohibited the production of
any "sexually explicit" material destined for interstate commerce
which employed a child under the age of sixteen.9 1 It also prohibited the transportation, mailing, or receipt of child pornography in
interstate commerce for the purpose of sale or distribution for
sale.99

Loopholes in the 1977 Act frustrated its enforcement against
some violators. Its major flaw, the requirement of a commercial
purpose, allowed those who produced child pornography for personal use or barter to escape federal prosecution. 100 It also failed to
prohibit distribution of material that was not obscene. 10 1 Although
the Act included prohibitions against production, the clandestine
nature of the production of child pornography made convictions
under the Act virtually nonexistent. 102 After 1978, traffic in child
pornography, went underground, and noncommercial distribution
flourished in the absence of federal sanctions. 10 3
In 1984, Congress passed the Child Protection Act 104 to remedy
these weaknesses. Reinforced by the Supreme Court's decision in
Ferber, Congress eliminated the obscenity requirement of the 1977
Act, removed the commercial purpose requirement from the prohibition against interstate trafficking, receipt, or mailing, and raised
the protected age to eighteen. 105 Federal prosecutions increased
dramatically as a result of these revisions. o According to the Attorney General's Commission, the 1977 Act "effectively halted the
bulk of the commercial child pornography industry," and the 1984

97. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (1982).
98. Id. § 2251(a).
99. Id. § 2252.
100. Loken, The Federal Battle Against Child Sexual Exploitation: Proposals for Reform, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S LAW J. 105, 112 (1986); 1 ArrORNEY GENERAL'S RLPORT, supra note
48, at 604.
101. 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1982). For a discussion of the practical effects of this obscenity
requirement, see Note, supra note 63, at 336.
102. 1 AT-ORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 48, at 604 n.421.
103. Id. at 604-05.
104. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2255 (Supp. III 1985).
105. Id.
106. 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 48, at 606.
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revisions allowed federal officials
to proceed against noncommer10 7
cial producers and distributors.

National concern over child pornography focused on the children
victimized by the production of this material. 08 Those who favored
strong sanctions against the sale and distribution of child pornography argued that its suppression was necessary to prevent the
abuse of children in the production process. 109 In hearings held
pursuant to the enactment of the 1977 Act, Congress assumed that
the production of sexually explicit material involving children was
child abuse per se and therefore was not entitled to first amendment protection. 110
Consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Ferber, the
1984 Act sought primarily to protect children, not to combat pornography."' The unique element of child pornography that distinguishes it from pornography using adult subjects and justifies
stricter regulation is that the child victim cannot give his or her
consent to perform and be photographed." 2 The child victim is injured not only by his role in the original production,13 but also because the materials exist and continue to circulate."
Whereas federal legislation must rest its authority on the movement of child pornography in interstate commerce, the states are
free to exercise their police power to prohibit all production and
distribution of child pornography." 4 States' early attempts at legislation, however, often suffered from the same weaknesses as the
first federal statute." 5 Before the Supreme Court decided Ferber,
fifteen states limited the reach of their child pornography statutes
to material that was legally obscene."' In the wake of Ferber,some
107. Id. at 607.
108. Note, supra note 63, at 327.
109. E.g., 123 CONG. REC. 33-050 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Roth); Sexual Exploitation of
Children:Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select Educ. of the House Comm. on Educ. &
Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977) (statement of Rep. Kildee).
110. Note, Child Pornography,the First Amendment, and the Media; The Constitutionality of Super-Obscenity Laws, 4 COMM/ENT 115, 121 (1981-1982).
111. Note, supra note 63, at 330-31.
112. People v. Spargo, 103 Il. App. 3d 280, 431 N.E.2d 27 (1982).
113. Shouvlin, supra note 57, at 545.
114. "The well-being of its children is of course a subject within the State's constitutional
power to regulate ..
" Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
115. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 749 n.2 (1982).
116. Id.
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states toughened their laws not only as to the content
of this mate117
rial, but also as to the range of prohibited acts.
In 1985, the Utah state legislature amended its child pornography laws to prohibit the private possession of child pornography., s
The legislature read Ferber as establishing different standards for
child pornography than for adult material. It concluded that the
policies underlying Ferber allowed states to prohibit even the private possession of child pornography. 9 In support of this stricter
standard, the legislature determined that the elimination of the
market for child pornography was necessary to prevent exploitation of children. 120 The lawmakers also noted that evidence had
connected prolonged viewing of pornography to antisocial
121
behavior.
APPLICATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO PRIVATE POSSESSION OF
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY

Analysis of Obscenity Law
The Court's treatment of obscenity cases has involved several
levels of analysis. In an early decision, Roth v. United States, the
Court simply concluded that the first amendment did not protect
obscene material because it was "no essential part of any exposition of ideas" and did not contribute to "the social interest in order and morality.' 22 Similarly, the Court in New York v. Ferber
began its first amendment analysis by citing cases that had classified obscenity as outside the realm of constitutionally protected
23
expression.

117. See, e.g., ILL. REV.
MINN. STAT.

STAT.

cl. 38, para. 11-20.1 (Supp. 1986) (effective Jan. 1, 1984);

§ 617.246 (Supp. 1987) (amended 1983); OHIO

REV. CODE ANN.

§ 2905.322

(Supp. 1985) (amended 1984). See generally State v. Meadows, 28 Ohio St. 3d 43, 51 n.10,
503 N.E.2d 697, 704 n.10 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1581 (1987).

118.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-5a-3 (Supp. 1987).

119. Recent Developments in Utah Law, 1986
120. Id. at 173, 178.

121. Id. at 176 (citing D. SCOTT, PORNOGRAPHY:

UTAH

L. REV. 95, 172, 177.

ITS EFFECTS ON THE FAMILY, COMMUNITY

AND CULTURE (1985)). Scott presents a distinctly unobjective discussion of the connection
between pornography and violent crime.
122. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 495 (1957) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
123. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 754 (1982).
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In later cases, however, the Court emphasized the need to protect "the sensibilities . . . of the general public. 12 4 This recognition of competing interests indicates that even obscene speech has
some value against which to weigh the justifications for restriction. 25 This content-based analysis first distinguishes between
"low-value" and "high-value" speech on the basis of subject matter
and then applies a balancing test to determine the circumstances
under which. that speech may be restricted."2 6 The post-Roth obFerber, employed this valuescenity cases, including Stanley and
12 7
test.
balancing
and
based analysis
The decision in Ferber established child pornography as a separate form of sexually explicit speech whose production and distribution the states may prohibit without resorting to the test for legal obscenity. 2 " Regardless of the content-based value that is
assigned to child pornography, however, this speech-all
speech-takes on a higher value when it is associated with the individual's right to possess it "in the privacy of his own home." ' If
the Court continues to employ a balancing test based on the value
of the speech at issue, the private possession of child pornography-like the private possession of any speech-will merit a value
commensurate with the constitutional protections it invokes.
State Court Decisions
In 1982, several state courts considered the constitutionality of
statutes criminalizing noncommercial conduct involving child pornography. Following Ferber, these courts held that the state's
strong interests in protecting children allowed it to proscribe activity that increased the demand for child pornography. In People v.
124. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567 (1969); see Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49, 58 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 19 (1973).
125. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 331 (7th Cir. 1985) (because pornography influences politics and social relations and controls attitudes at home
and in the legislature, it has value as speech).
126. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 67, at 195.
127. Schauer, supra note 10, at 306-08. Schauer finds this analysis the most persuasive in
describing the basis for the Court's decision in Ferber.
128. The Court in Ferber held that states could prohibit the production and distribution

of child pornography regardless of whether it was legally obscene, because the harm occurred despite this classification. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
129. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969).
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Spargo, the Illinois Appellate Court held that the state's interest
in preventing the solicitation of children for the production of
child pornography justified a ban on the noncommercial exhibition
of child pornography. 13 0 As in Ferber, the court focused not on a
generalized harm to society, but on the state's "strong and compelling interest. . . in preventing children from becoming involved in
31
the production of child pornography.'
The court in People v. Godek 32 cited Judge Jasen's dissenting
opinion in People v. Ferber33 in upholding a statute that banned
the private display of child pornography to consenting adults even
without sufficient proof that the child participants resided in that
state.13 4 The court focused on the economic incentive argument,
emphasizing that the statute's purpose was the protection of "the
minors whose involvement will continue only so long as there is
1 35
some market, public or private, for the finished product.'
These state cases echo Ferber in supporting legislative attempts
to broaden the attack on child pornography. Following Judge
Jasen's lead, 3 " courts have abandoned the public morality argument that failed in Stanley v. Georgia 37 in favor of asserting the
state's compelling interest in safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of minors. 38 The harm to the child victim
stems not only from the potential for physical abuse during production but also from the knowledge that "the recording is circulating within the mass distribution system for child pornography.' 39 States are therefore free to attack both commercial and
noncommercial distribution in order to reach this exploitation ef-

130. People v. Spargo, 103 Ill. App. 3d 280, 286-87, 431 N.E.2d 27, 31 (1982).
131. Id. at 286, 431 N.E.2d at 31.
132. 113 Misc. 2d 599, 449 N.Y.S.2d 438 (Sup. Ct. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1047
(1984).
133. People v. Ferber, 52 N.Y.2d 674, 681, 422 N.E.2d 523, 526, 449 N.Y.S.2d 863, 867
(1981) (Jasen, J., dissenting), rev'd, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
134. Godek, 113 Misc. 2d at 610, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 435.
135. Id. at 608, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 435. See also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761
(1982).
136. People v. Ferber, 52 N.Y.2d at 685-86, 422 N.E.2d at 529-30, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 869-70
(Jasen, J., dissenting).
137. 394 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1969).
138. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-57 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S.
596, 607 (1982)).
139. Shouvlin, supra note 57, at 545.
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fectively. 140 Finally, the need to remove economic incentives for
participation in the industry also justifies a rejection of overbreadth claims.'
The Protection of Private Possession
In State v. Meadows, the state of Ohio argued that the Supreme
Court in Ferber had enunciated a different standard for child pornography than for other types of obscene material, and that this
standard would permit states to prohibit the private possession of
child pornography.' 42 This argument, however, confuses the standard of protection with the permissible remedy. By establishing a
different test for child pornography than for adult pornography,
the Supreme Court simply recognized that the production itself
was more harmful when it involved children. This recognition of
greater harm from production does not necessarily indicate greater
harm from private possession, nor does it give to states the same
freedom to regulate private possession that Ferber conferred regarding production.
Analysis of Harm
The argument that states should be permitted to regulate child
pornography more severely than adult pornography begins with
the proposition that child pornography harms the actors because
they are too young to give their consent to participate and be photographed. 143 Child pornography, the argument continues, is therefore inherently more harmful than adult pornography, and this
greater harm justifies allowing the states a greater reach in regulating production.'4 The states' strong interest in protecting the wel140. People v. Spargo, 103 Ill. App. 3d 280, 285, 431 N.E.2d 27, 31 (1982).
141. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 771; see People v. Godek, 113 Misc. 2d 599, 608, 449 N.Y.S.2d
428, 435 (Sup. Ct. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1047 (1984).
142. State v. Meadows, 28 Ohio St. 3d 43, 48-49, 503 N.E.2d 697, 702 (1986), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 1581 (1987).
143. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761; Spargo, 103 Ill. App. 3d at 285-87, 431 N.E.2d at 30-31.
144. Meadows, 28 Ohio St. 3d at 50, 503 N.E.2d at 703. For arguments that the production of adult pornography can be as harmful to adult actors as the production of child pornography is to child actors, see Blakely, Is One Woman's Sexuality Another Woman's Pornography?, Ms., Apr. 1985, at 37; Jacobs, Patterns of Violence: A Feminist Perspective on
the Regulation of Pornography,7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 5, 20-23 (1984). But see 1 ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 48, at 412. The Attorney General's Commission stated that
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fare of its children justifies extending the scope of its regulation
beyond that permitted in regulating the general welfare.' 4 5 The Supreme Court extended the scope of permissible regulation in Ferber by allowing states to regulate child pornography without regard to the obscenity requirement established in Miller v.
California.
Ferbertherefore established that because the production of child
pornography is itself harmful, the states can regulate some aspects
of child pornography without regard to whether the material is obscene. 4 ' In approving a lower threshold for the regulation of child
pornography than for adult pornography, the Court acknowledged
that child pornography is not a victimless crime. 4 7 If sexually explicit material depicts children, it probably does not fall within the
protection of the first amendment, but if the material depicts
adults, it may be protected, subject to the obscenity test in Miller
v. California.145 The Ferber decision placed all child pornography
on the same footing as obscene adult pornography 4 9 and thus enabled states to prosecute child pornography on a broader scale than
adult pornography. The distinction between child and adult pornography, therefore, concerns what materials may be regulated
rather than how they may be regulated.' 50

"harms to performers involved would not otherwise be taken to be a sufficient condition for
restriction of the photographs rather than the underlying conduct." Id.
145. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-57.
146. The potential for harm to the child victims is the same regardless of whether the
material is legally obscene. Id. at 761.
147. Id. at 758 & n.9.
148. 413 U.S. 15, 19 (1973).
149. The Court in Ferber stated:
The test for child pornography is separate from the obscenity standard enunciated in Miller, but may be compared to it for the purpose of clarity. The
Miller formulation is adjusted in the following respects: A trier of fact need not
find that the material appeals to the prurient interest of the average person; it
is not required that sexual conduct portrayed be done so in a patently offensive manner; and the material at issue need not be considered as a whole.
Ferber,458 U.S. at 764.
150. Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 6, State v. Meadows, 28 Ohio St. 3d 43, 503 N.E.2d
697 (1986) (No. 86-233), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1581 (1987).
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Application of ConstitutionalProtections

The Supreme Court established in Stanley that the permissible
reach of a state's power to regulate in furtherance of its citizens'
welfare was circumscribed by the protections of the Bill of
Rights.1 51 The particular rights involved in the private possession
of otherwise unlawful material-the guarantees of the first and
fourth amendments-work synergistically to protect the possession
of material that otherwise would not merit protection. 152 Previous
cases established that private noncommercial possession of unprotected material outside the home is not entitled to constitutional
protection. 15 3 Material that is completely outside the first amendment likewise receives no special protection simply because it is in
the home. 154 In Stanley, however, the Court established that the
combination of first and fourth amendment protections prohibited
a state from reaching into a person's home to
seize unprotected
55
material when that material involved speech.
151. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
152. See id. at 563-64.
153. United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973) (denying constitutional protection to the
private exchange of obscene materials outside the home); United States v. Miller, 776 F.2d
978 (11th Cir. 1985) (no right to receive child pornography through the mails); People v.
Spargo, 103 Ill. App. 3d 280, 431 N.E.2d 27 (1982) (allowing prosecution of private exhibition of child pornography); People v. Godek, 113 Misc. 2d 599, 449 N.Y.S.2d 428 (Sup. Ct.
1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1047 (1984) (state could proscribe private display of child pornography to consenting adults).
154. The Court in Stanley stated: "What we have said in no way infringes upon the
power of the State or Federal Government to make possession of other items, such as narcotics, firearms, or stolen goods, a crime. . . . No First Amendment rights are involved in
most statutes making mere possession criminal." Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568 n.11. In holding
that Ohio could criminalize the private possession of child pornography, the Supreme Court
of Ohio interpreted this footnote to allow states to reach otherwise-protected speech if it
found "compelling reasons . . . for overriding the right of the individual to possess those
materials." Meadows, 28 Ohio St. 3d at 47, 503 N.E.2d at 700 (quoting Stanley, 394 U.S. at
568 n.11). In footnote 11, however, Justice Marshall's example of such a compelling reason
deals with the possession of material that "could be used to the injury of the United States
or to the advantage of any foreign nation." Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568 n.11 (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 793(d) (1982)). Private possession of child pornography hardly rises to the level of possession of state secrets. The Supreme Court of Ohio's misapplication of footnote 11 thus does
not support its holding adequately. See Meadows, 28 Ohio St. 3d at 357, 503 N.E.2d at 716
(Brown, J., concurring).
155. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565. Although the Court premised its holding in Stanley
solely on first amendment grounds, both the language of Justice Marshall's opinion and
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In criminalizing the possession of child pornography, the Utah
legislature cited the need to protect children from exploitation. 5 6
It reasoned that child pornography was used as part of the act of
child abuse, to induce the child's participation in pornographic
productions. 157 Notwithstanding such a relationship, the legislature's solution, prohibiting private possession, ignores the fundamental principles of the Supreme Court's first amendment
58
jurisprudence.1
In evaluating whether sexually explicit speech should be protected under the first amendment, the Court has used a contentbased analysis that incorporates a balancing test to determine the
circumstances under which the speech may be restricted. 59 Although the holding in Stanley established that the right to possess
material in one's home was of sufficient value to survive the state's
interest in regulating that material,6 0 the Court did not preclude
the possibility that a state interest could rise to a level sufficient to
outweigh the first amendment interests at stake in Stanley.'6' In
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slayton, Chief Justice Burger cited a minority report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography
indicating "at least an arguable correlation between obscene material and crime.' 62 This issue of possible harm to third parties is
significant because under the Court's current content-based analy-

later commentary support the conclusion that fourth amendment rights are also involved.
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
156. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5a-1 (Supp. 1986).
157. D. Scorr, supra note 121, at 9; 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 48, at
649-50. The evidence that indicates that child abusers use child pornography to lower their
victim's inhibitions also indicates that they can and do use adult pornography for the same
purpose. 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 48, at 686.
158. See, e.g., Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565. See also T. EMERSON, supra note 3, at 494. "Assuming obscene material could be proved to create a ... danger of illegal behavior, it would
not follow that the expression should be suppressed. Rather, the basic principles of a system
of freedom of expression would require that society deal directly with the . . action and
leave the expression alone." Id.
159. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763-64; Stone, supra note 67, at 195.
160. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568.
161. See id. at 567 ("Given the present state of knowledge, the State may no more prohibit mere possession of obscene matter on the ground that it may lead to antisocial conduct
.") (emphasis added).
162. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slayton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973) (citing U.S. Comm'n on
Obscenity & Pornography, The Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography
392-93 (1970) (statements of Morton A. Hill and Winfrey C. Link)).

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:187

sis, even speech that receives maximum first amendment protection can be restricted for a sufficiently compelling reason.'
Whether pornography in general and child pornography in particular actually cause a viewer to commit sexual or violent crimes
has been the subject of recent study and much heated debate.""
The respondents in American Booksellers advanced this argument
to justify proposed restrictions on adult pornography. 6 5 The argument has also been used to justify the state's power to criminalize
private possession of child pornography. 6 The court in American
Booksellers held, however, that even if the premise that viewing
pornography causes harmful behavior were accurate, the restriction
on speech was too great to justify an antipornography ordinance. 7
Balancing the Interests
Discussing the conflict between first amendment protections and
the state's interest in safeguarding the welfare of its children, the
Court in Ferber held that the "balance of competing interests"
would not preclude the state from exercising its regulatory power
to criminalize the production and distribution of child pornography. 16 8 Extending a state's regulatory power to the criminalization
of private possession, however, does not necessarily follow from the
analysis in Ferber, because different interests are involved. The
state's interest in the welfare of its children must be balanced
against the strong first and fourth amendment protections established in Stanley. 6 First amendment case law has established
that even speech at the core of the first amendment can be re-

163. Schauer, supra note 10, at 304-06.
164. E.g., American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985); 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT,

supra note 48; Blakeley, supra note 144; Comment, The Indianapo-

lis PornographyOrdinance: Does the Right to Free Speech Outweigh Pornography'sHarm
to Women?, 54 UNIV. OF CINN. L. REV. 249 (1985).
165. See American Booksellers Ass'n, 771 F.2d at 325, 329 & n.2.
166. Brief for Defendant, State v. Meadows, 28 Ohio St. 3d 43, 503 N.E.2d 697 (1986)
(No. 86-233), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1581 (1987); Recent Developments in Utah Law, supra
note 119, at 176.
167. 771 F.2d at 329-31. Accord T. EMERSON, supra note 10, at 497-98 (arguing that this
link is far too tenuous to be useful and that the possible advantage of preventing some
crime would not outweigh the damage done to freedom of expression).
168. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
169. See supra text accompanying notes 33-47.
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stricted if the competing interest is strong enough. 17 0 Proponents
of a state's authority to regulate the private possession of child
pornography should therefore have to demonstrate a state interest
sufficiently compelling to outweigh the first and fourth amendment
protection of the private possession of otherwise unprotected
speech.
Because some evidence may link private possession of child pornography and child sexual abuse, 171 supporters of criminalization
contend that this danger justifies a state's power to regulate private possession. A careful analysis of this argument demonstrates,
however, that the proposed remedy-criminalization of private
possession of child pornography-is not directly related to the
harms intended to be prevented.
Once the material has been produced, states cannot prevent the
initial harm, which occurs in the production itself. States can, however, prevent the subsequent injury to the child victim that occurs
when such material is exhibited, traded between collectors, or
sold. 7 2 Publication of this material "arguably imposes a harm on
the child victim analogous to the emotional harm redressed in the
invasion of privacy tort.' 7 3 The remedy for such an injury is limited to civil damages, and does not include criminal sanctions
against the speech itself.17 4 The state's interest in regulating child
pornography therefore "is better characterized as protection of the
child from emotional and psychological harm .
. 175 This is the
interest against which the importance of the first and fourth
amendment protections of private possession must be weighed.

170. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam); Schauer, supra note 10, at

305.
171. 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 48, at 649-50.
172. "A child who has posed for a camera must go through life knowing that the recording
is circulating within the mass distribution system for child pornography.... [H]e must
carry with him the distressful feeling that his act has been recorded for all to see." Shouvlin,
supra note 57, at 545. See also People v. Spargo, 103 Ill. App. 3d 280, 286, 431 N.E.2d 27,
31-32 (1982) (noting that the continuing fear of exposure from distribution is as damaging
as the initial sexual exploitation); 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 48, at 650.
"Each time the pornography is exchanged the children involved are victimized again." Id. at
651.
173. Note, Protectionof ChildrenFrom Use in Pornography:Toward Constitutionaland
Enforceable Legislation, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REP. 295, 301 (1979).
174. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 809-12 (4th ed. 1971).
175. Note, supra note 173, at 316 n.123.
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Although the child is harmed simply by the continued existence
of the pornographic material, 1 6 practical considerations make this
an insufficient basis on which to justify a statute that so strongly
impacts first amendment rights. Each time the photographs
change hands, the child victim is harmed again. 1 7 The states, however, already have the authority to prohibit these transactions.'7 8
Although the child will never be sure that all photographs have
been destroyed, this harm cannot be redressed by criminal sanctions. Because photographs "are timeless and may be distributed
and circulated throughout the world for years after they are initially created," 79e a ban on private possession is necessarily less effective in protecting the child victim's privacy rights than strong
sanctions against production and distribution.
Proponents of a state's right to prohibit private possession of
child pornography also argue that pedophiles use such materials to
solicit the participation of other children in sexual activity. 180 Although states have a strong interest in preventing this solicitation,
criminalization of private possession will not necessarily deter such
activity. Pedophiles' 8 ' often have extensive collections of erotica,
including both child and adult pornography," 2 and research indicates that they are just as likely to use adult pornography as child
pornography to lower the inhibitions of a child victim.' Criminalizing the private possession of child pornography therefore may
not have the desired effect of decreasing opportunities for child
abuse.

176. 1 ATTORNEY

GENERAL'S REPORT,

supra note 48, at 651.

177. Id.
178. See, e.g., People v. Spargo, 103 Ill. App. 3d 280, 431 N.E.2d 27 (1982) (private exhibition of child pornography not protected); People v. Godek, 113 Misc. 2d 599, 449 N.Y.S.2d
428 (Sup. Ct. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1047 (1984) (noncommercial exchange of child
pornography denied constitutional protection).

179. 1 ATTORNEY

GENERAL'S REPORT,

supra note 48, at 651.

180. Shouvlin, supra note 57, at 610, 649-50.
181. The Attorney General's Commission on Pornography defines a pedophile as a person

having a clear sexual preference for children. 1 ATTORNEY
at 609.
182. Id.

183. Id. at 686.

GENERAL'S REPORT,

supra note 48,
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Administrative Convenience
A second argument in support of allowing states to prohibit private possession is that this prohibition is a necessary incident to
controlling production and distribution of child pornography. This
argument rests on the alleged difficulty of proving other offenses,
such as production, distribution, and exhibition. 184 In response to
the same argument, the Court in Stanley stated that even if such
difficulties existed, "we do not think that they would justify infringement of the individual's right to read or observe what he
pleases."'1 8 5 The Court found that right "so fundamental to our

scheme of individual liberty [that] its restriction may not be justified by the need to ease the administration of otherwise valid criminal laws."' 8 6
The Court has rejected this administrative convenience argument in many other contexts as a rationale for restricting fundamental rights. 8 7 In People v. Spargo,'8 8 the state advanced the ad-

ministrative convenience rationale to justify its regulation of the
private, noncommercial exhibition of child pornography outside
the home. 89 The court applied Stanley to the possession of child
pornography and held that "[w]hatever constitutional protections
Stanley confers were relinquished by the defendant when he removed the child pornography from the confines of his own home
and exhibited it to another." 90 The court also reasoned that a ban
184. See, e.g., 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 48, at 413 ("virtually all child
pornography is produced surreptitiously, and thus . . . enforcement will be difficult");
Loken, Child Pornography-A Turning Point, 16 THE PROSECUTOR 15, 16 (Summer 1982)
(noting the clandestine nature of the child pornography industry and the difficulties inherent in monitoring the same of pornographic material); Note, supra note 63, at 346 (organized crime is now deeply involved in child pornography).
185. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969).
186. Id.
187. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (administrative convenience
cannot stand as the sole rationale for a statute that distinguished on the basis of sex); Smith
v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) (administrative convenience cannot justify criminal conviction for possession of an obscene book when the defendant had no knowledge of the
book's content).
188. 103 Ill. App. 3d 280, 431 N.E.2d 27 (1982).
189. Id. at 285, 431 N.E.2d at 30.
190. Id.
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on private, noncommercial exhibition of child pornography would
discourage production by decreasing demand for this material. 191
No evidence presently supports the contention that prohibiting
the private possession of child pornography would significantly advance the state's interest in deterring child abuse. 192 Most recommendations have focused on production and distribution as the
causes of harm to the child victim. 93 The states' adoption of uniform laws directed against production and distribution of child
pornography would be more effective.9 4 For example, the rate of
federal prosecutions increased dramatically following the 1984 revisions that strengthened the federal Child Protection Act. 95
Because states are not limited to regulating child pornography
that moves in interstate commerce, they may prohibit all production and trafficking in such material.9 6 The report of the Attorney
General's Commission on Pornography notes that some states do
not yet ban trafficking, an activity that harms the child victim
more than private possession does, and which would carry a
97
harsher penalty.
Statutory prohibition of the private possession of child pornography is an inefficient and ineffective means of preventing the serious problem of child sexual abuse. Although most pedophiles collect child pornography, 9 8 all collectors are not necessarily child
molesters.' 9 9 States may, however, prosecute collectors who also
distribute or produce pornographic material for these more serious
offenses, which will carry heavier penalties than mere possession.
The efficacy of any sentence, of course, depends on its actual im-

191. Id.
192. Studies indicate that the enforcement of existing child pornography and child abuse
laws is itself problemetical. Abusers can be "average" citizens as well as depraved individuals on the edge of society. The former often are not prosecuted or are released with only a
fine. D. ScoTT, supra note 121, at 13.
193. See, e.g., Shouvlin, supra note 57, at 544-45; Note, supra note 173, at 299-301.
194. 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 48, at 660-64, 670-71.
195. Id. at 606-07.
196. Id. at 607.
197. Id. at 608.
198. Id. at 609, 681.
199. For example, the court in Meadows found no indication that the defendant had participated in any unlawful activity except the possession of magazines depicting children engaging in sexual activities. State v. Meadows, No. C-850091 (Ohio App. Dec. 18, 1985), rev'd,
28 Ohio St. 3d 43, 503 N.E.2d 697 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1581 (1987).

1987]

PRIVATE POSSESSION OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY

pact on the abuser. 00 Practicality demands that limited law enforcement resources are best spent in prosecuting those who are
involved in the more harmful offenses of producing and distributing child pornography.20 '
CONCLUSION

A close reading of the Supreme Court's decision in New York v.
Ferbersuggests that the Court did not intend its ruling to do more
than alter the standard for child pornography so the states could
regulate the production and distribution of this material regardless
of any obscenity requirement.20 2 The purpose of expanding the
states' power to regulate was to prevent the abuse of children used
to produce the material.203 Although advocates of the states' power
to criminalize the private possession of child pornography contend
that their purpose is likewise to prevent child abuse, they face two
obstacles, one practical and one constitutional. First, criminalizing
private possession may not have the desired effect of reducing the
incidence of child abuse. 0 4 Second, the constitutional protections
against which this purpose is weighed are much stronger for the
case of private possession than for production or distribution. 5
Stanley v. Georgia and its progeny established that a state could
regulate unprotected speech everywhere except when it was privately possessed in the home.20 6 The Ferber holding placed all

child pornography on the same footing as material that is obscene
under the Miller v. California test.2 0 7 The inescapable conclusion
200. One case report states that an offender caught in the act of sexually molesting a
child received a sentence of five years imprisonment, all but six months of which were suspended. 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 48, at 685-86.
201. See id. at 660-71 (recommending that states toughen their child pornography laws to
make many offenses a felony).
202. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764-65 (1982) (explaining that the decision
removed the requirements of the Miller test and effectively equated all child pornography
with obscenity as defined in Miller).
203. See supra text accompanying notes 58-61. Any doubt as to the Court's intention to
do more than address the problem of child abuse in prodaction is dispelled by its suggestion, in dictum, that "if it were necessary for literary or artistic value, a person over the
statutory age who perhaps looked younger could be utilized." Ferber,458 U.S. at 763.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 176-83, 192.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 128-29.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 33-39.
207. Ferber,458 U.S. at 764.

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:187

is that the state is free to regulate material depicting child pornography except when an individual possesses it "in the privacy of his
' 08
own home.
Susan G. Caughlan

208. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969).

